This work describes a novel class of biscuit conditional (Austin (1958), Ebert et al. (2014), Franke (2007), Goebel (2017), Rawlins (2020), and Siegel (2006) a.o.), the **perspectival biscuit** (PB), which arises when an *if*-clause containing a generic pronoun is used to shift perspective for the interpretation of a perspective-sensitive item, e.g. to a viewpoint at the door for interpreting *behind* in *behind the desk* in (1) (see Fig. 1). With non-generic DPs as in (2), the biscuit reading disappears.

(1)   If {you_{GEN}/one_{GEN}} are/is at the door, the cat is behind the desk.   → BISC

(2)   If {you_{2SG}/Bob/someone/no one} are/is at the door, the cat is behind the desk.   → HYP

PBs are characterized by three features: **(i)** PBs contain a perspective-sensitive item in the consequent; **(ii)** PBs contain a generic or impersonal pronoun (you_{GEN}, one_{GEN}) in the antecedent, co-referential with an implicit perspective holder argument in the consequent; and **(iii)** PBs entail a contextual update of a fully-specified, propositionally stable consequent, adopting a more generalized notion of biscuithood proposed by Rawlins (2020), with the antecedent in PBs serving only to specify the relevant perspective. We give an analysis demonstrating that biscuithood in PBs arises due to generic quantification exclusively over individuals, not worlds.

Puzzle   Existing pragmatic theories of biscuits do not straightforwardly predict biscuithood for PBs. In an influential pragmatic analysis of biscuits which maintains a standard semantics for conditionals, Franke (2007) derives consequent entailment via a notion called *epistemic* (or informational) *independence*, which holds between two propositions A and C only if determining the truth of one does not determine or rule out the truth of the other, relative to an agent's informational state. When the antecedent and consequent issues are (or can be epistemically inferred to be) dependent, the reading is *hypothetical*, i.e., the truth of the consequent depends on the antecedent. On the other hand, in the classic example (3), an agent knows that the antecedent issue (whether or not you're hungry) has no bearing on the presence of biscuits; they are independent.

(3)   If you're hungry, there's biscuits on the sideboard.   → BISC (mod. from Austin (1958))

Franke shows that epistemic independence, together with pragmatic strengthening, gives rise to biscuithood. This notion has been further refined by Goebel (2017) into *factual independence*, by taking into account law-like dependencies among facts in addition to epistemic states. The independence accounts correctly predict the hypothetical readings in (2), e.g., by supposing a perfectly plausible information state in which the cat is known to be shy, thus leading to dependence.

However, it is unclear how these accounts can determine independence in case of the antecedent *you_{GEN}'re at the door* for (1), which seems contextually underspecified and unable to be evaluated as a standalone proposition. Simple sentences with generic *you* or *one* do not seem to occur naturally, or are marginal at best; they are most felicitous in modalized contexts, e.g., with frequency adverbs (e.g., *you never know*), with deontic *must* as in (4a), or, importantly for us, in (indicative) conditionals as in (4b); most apparently bare uses are probably attributable to modal subordination.

(4)   a.   #One arrives on time. *vs.* One must arrive on time.

         b.   #One has a nose. *vs.* If one has a nose, one can breathe.   (Moltmann 2006)

To be clear, the claim is not that the antecedent of (1) in isolation fails to have any truth conditions whatsoever; yet any attempt to coerce it into a stable proposition by using usually appropriate paraphrases like *someone*, *anyone*, *the typical person*, etc. also undesirably force a hypothetical reading when reunited with the consequent. On the contrary, whatever instability is present in the *consequent* proposition (due to the perspective-sensitivity of *behind*) is easily resolved by making its implicit perspective holder argument explicit, by adding the phrase *from X's perspective*. This is

the route taken by Francez (2015) in his analysis of *chimerical conditionals*, which are ambiguous between biscuit and hypothetical readings. However, neither PBs nor their hypothetical variants in (2) are chimerical, and cannot be disambiguated as a chimerical conditional can.

Analysis   We claim that the locus of biscuithood for PBs is instead due to a quirk of the generic operator, namely, the ability to quantify over individual variables contributed by a generic pronoun without necessarily also quantifying over worlds or situations (Moltmann 2010). PBs arise when a proposition that generically quantifies over only individuals is paraphrased by restating the restrictor as an *if*-clause, a property that gives rise to a syntactically normal conditional but produces a "modally defanged," non-hypothetical interpretation.

We start with the following analysis of spatial perspective-shifting adjuncts given by Mulligan and Rawlins (2022), which analyzes both left-adjoined *from*-adjuncts and *if*-clauses with generic *you* using the same form, by binding the free implicit perspective holder variable of *behind* with a generic quantifier over (C)ontextually restricted individuals that the speaker (I)dentifies with (a decomposition of GEN borrowed from Pearson (2013) to give a perspectival semantics for *tasty*):

(5)   [GEN x: x is at the door] λz [the cat is behind(z) the desk].
       $= [\forall x : \text{at}(x, \text{the-door}) \land C(x) \land I(c_{\text{speaker}}, x)]$ behind(the-cat, the-desk, x)

(5) is somewhat idiosyncratic in that GEN is often used to range over situations in addition to individuals, e.g., in *Mary smokes after dinner*:

(6)   [GEN $s, x : x = \text{Mary} \land$ it is after dinner in s] x smokes in s.   (mod. Krifka et al. (1995))

Like nearly every quantifier that can be analyzed with tripartite (i.e., [OPERATOR: RESTRICTOR] SCOPE) structure, GEN can be re-expressed in terms of a conditional (Partee 1995), which follows straightforwardly from Kratzer (1981)'s thesis that *if*-clauses are nothing but the restrictor of various operators. So (6) could just as easily be the LF for the conditional *If it's after dinner, Mary smokes*. However, while the restrictor of (6) makes a claim about worlds and links two possibly dependent issues, (5) does not, keeping the world fixed: being at the door is a property of an individual, rather a situation, though paraphrasing with *if* is nevertheless possible. This is what gives rise to the conditional form but non-hypothetical character of PBs.

In fact, the equivalent perspective-shifting meaning may be expressed without a generic pronoun by using a more conventional conditional tactic – counterfactuality:

(7)   If you were at the door, the cat would be behind the desk from your perspective.

(1) and (7) arguably have the same use conditions and a very similar meaning. But whether or not the same cognitive strategy (e.g., mental simulation) is ultimately deployed is a separate issue; we claim that the two sentences deploy distinct linguistic strategies, and this difference is manifested in the subjunctive morphology and need for an explicit *from*-adjunct in the latter.

Conclusion   We have shown that perspectival biscuit conditionals like (1) produce a biscuit-like reading, triggered by the use of a generic pronoun. The perspectival-biscuit pattern, e.g. entailment of a (contextually specified) consequent proposition, generalizes to other perspective-sensitive items including location-sensitive *local* and personal taste predicate *tasty* (Pearson 2013):

(8)   a.   If you$_{\text{GEN}}$ live in Barcelona, there are many local tailors.   (mod. Francez (2015))
       b.   If you$_{\text{GEN}}$'re a gecko, crickets are tasty.

We suggest that across this class, generic quantification over individuals is responsible for this reading, in contrast to more typical biscuit conditionals where existing prior analysis (e.g. the independence account) can apply; overall this account suggests that there may be multiple compositional strategies leading to the classic empirical signature of a biscuit conditional.

Figure 1: Illustration of (1). *Behind the desk* is underspecified w.r.t. frame of reference. Compare: *If you're at the window, the cat is to the left of the desk.* See also Fig. 1 from Mulligan and Rawlins (2022).

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